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Abstract: In a two period model of strategic entry deterrence where the incumbent 
firm moves before the entrant by installing capacity for production, Dixit ( 1980) argued 
that in a (perfect) equilibrium excess capacity would not be observed, contradicting 
Spence's (1977) result on the same issue. In this note, we show that Dixit's result may 
not always remain true when we allow for demand uncertainty. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
To see the problem of role of investment in capacity when there is a potential entrant 
in the market, Spence ( 1977) studied how much capacity the incumbent firm would like 
to install prior to entry in order to deter entry. He argued that an incumbent should 
hold excess capacity under the threat of entry, meaning if the entrant enters the market 
the incumbent will use all its capacity to produce output which will eventually drive 
down the price to such a level that will make entry unprofitable. This is a kind of limit 
pricing argument. At the same time, in case of no entry, the incumbent will be left 
with costly idle capacity. That is, excess capacity will be observed in the event of no 
entry. Later, Dixit ( 1980) argued that such a limit pricing behaviour or holding excess 
capacity is not an optimal behaviour of the incumbent firm. Dixit considered a two 
stage game, where in the first stage the incumbent chooses the level of capacity (which 
can be increased in the second stage, if needed), and in the second stage chooses the 
level of output. He showed that in a subgame perfect equilibrium, the incumbent firm 
will be left with no idle capacity since holding excess capacity has no entry deterring 
effect and Spence's excess capacity hypothesis was based on a non-credible threat by 
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the incumbent towards the entrant. At the same time, Dixit also emphasized the fact 
that entry prevention should not be a prior constraint, because in some situations, the 
established firm can be better off by accommodating the entrant; and more importantly, 
under all circumstances, (be it entry deterrence or entry accommodation) the incumbent 
will install exactly that amount of capacity in stage one, which will be needed to produce 
output in stage two, in other words, excess capacity will never be observed. 1 
Now, one natural question arises, what happens to the incumbent's behaviour when 
we add demand uncertainty to the model. More precisely, I ask when there is a potential 
entrant in the market whether Dixit's result of holding no excess capacity in equilibrium 
remains valid under demand uncertainty as well. 
In this context, I define the notion of observing excess capacity in the following way. 
Suppose 
a] there are two states of demand (namely, high and low) where each state might 
realize with some probability, and 
b] an incumbent firm installs capacity before the actual demand is realized. It also 
anticipates a potential entrant in the market after the demand realizes. 
Now consider a situation where the incumbent installs a level of capacity such that 
part of the installed capacity remains unutilised after production of output in the actual 
state, then naturally, the incumbent firm ends up with idle capacity i.e. excess capac-
ity is observed. For example, the capacity needed to produce output corresponding to 
an equilibrium at some low state of demand is obviously less than the capacity needed 
to produce output corresponding to some high state of demand. So if any capacity is 
installed in anticipation to meet the equilibrium demand in the high·state, a realization 
of low state of demand will inevitably lead to excess capacity. On the other hand, we 
also assume that the incumbent has the option to add on its pre-installed capacity after 
demand is realized, if needed. Now this is a crucial assumption which distinguishes this 
paper from other papers (see Perrakis and Warskett (1983), Maskin (1999)) in the litera-
ture on the same issue. The question is: given this "add-on flexibility" on capacity after 
the demand is realized, why in the first place the incumbent firm should be interested 
in installing a (costly) capacity that may remain idle? We try to find an answer to this 
question in this paper. The intuition is: by committing to a certain level of capacity in 
the pre-entry stage, the incumbent firm can position itself so as to maintain a strategic 
cost advantage over the potential entrant in the post-entry stage while producing the ac-
tual output. Hence, a priori is not clear whether (or not) an incumbent firm should hold 
a capacity that may remain unutilised in some state when there is a potential entrant in 
the market under demand uncertainty. The final outcome on the choice of capacity will 
depend on the interplay between the act of commitment by pre-installing capacity and 
the flexibility to add on later. Given this scenario, we actually show that, unlike Dixit's, 
occurrence of excess (idle) capacity is a possibility when there is some uncertainty in 
the demand. To this end, it should be emphasized that in a similar situation, a monopoly 
1 Other studies related to this analysis have also been done by Spulber ( 1981 ), Schmalensee ( 1981 ), Bulow, 
Geanakopolos and Klemperer ( 1985), Sal oner ( 1985), Basu and Singh ( 1990), inter alia. 
PODDAR: EXCESS CAPACITY: A NOTE 77 
firm facing no threat of entry would never hold a capacity that may remain idle, because 
the incentive to have a strategic advantage is completely absent and at the same time it 
has always the option to increase its capacity later, if needed. So the incentive to install 
capacity in the initial stage arjses only for the strategic purpose. 
As cited before, the issue of entry deterrence and entry accommodation under demand 
uncertainty and the possibility of excess capacity has also been studied by Perrakis and 
Warskett (1983), Maskin (1999). The major difference between those papers and this 
paper lies in the crucial assumption of "add-on flexibvility" in capacity in the later 
stage after the demand is realized. In those papers, it is assumed that once capacity is 
installed (in the pre-demand realization state) by the incumbent, it can never be changed. 
We find this assumption quite restrictive in this set up. 2 After all, if the entrant can 
install capacity for production after the demand is realized, there is no reason why the 
incumbent would not be able to do so.3 
There is another aspect where we would like to draw readers' attention. In this paper, 
we will consider two possible continuation games, namely the game of entry deter-
rence and entry accommodation. To this end, we would like to emphasize that our main 
objective of this analysis is to see whether excess capacity is observed (or not) at the 
equilibrium in each of the continuation game. We do not intend to solve for the incum-
bent firm's optimal strategy against the potential entrant i.e. we do not solve under what 
circumstance entry deterrence (or entry accommodation) is optimal to the incumbent. 4 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I present the basic model 
with demand uncertainty. Entry is considered in section 3. The analysis on entry de-
terrence and entry accommodation are done separately. Section 4 concludes with some 
discussion. 
2. THE SETUP 
Consider a model with an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. Both firms produce 
a single homogeneous good. The demand for the good is given by the usual linear 
demand function: 
P(Q) =a - Q, 
where Q is the aggregate supply. 
There is a demand uncertainty and suppose there are two states of demand that may 
realize. The demand can be high (a = aH) with probability () or low (a = aL) with 
probability (l - 8). The game is as follows. There are two time periods, t = 1, 2. The 
demand realizes at t = 2. Firm 1 (the incumbent) is there at t = 1 and firm 2 (the 
2 Dixit ( 1980) in his original model has also allowed for the flexibility in capacity expansion. 
3 Kim (1996) allows this flexibility for the incumbent to increase its capacity later, however, in that study 
since the whole analysis is done in dynamic framework (rather than a static model like this), this option 
naturally comes into the analysis. 
4 It is intuitively true that if the entrant faces entry cost, then entry deterrence is likely to be optimal to the 
incumbent when entry cost is high, while entry accommodation will be optimal when entry cost is low and 
this remains true irrespective of the fact that the incumbent faces demand uncertainty or not. Such results are 
already known in the literature. 
78 KEIO ECONOMIC STUDIES 
entrant) arrives at t = 2, after the demand is realized.5 The incumbent firm chooses a 
pre-entry capacity levek ki in the first period (t = 1). This capacity may subsequently 
be increased, but cannot be reduced. As in Dixit ( 1980), we assume that both firms 
compete in quantities in the second period a la Cournot irrespective of the level of 
capacity installed by the incumbent firm in the first period. 
2.1. Cost 
Suppose that firm 1 has installed capacity ki in period 1. If it is producing output qi 
within its capacity limit i.e. if q1 ::::; k1 its total cost: 
C1 = rk1 + wq1 , 
where r is the unit cost of capacity and w is the unit cost of output. 
However, if it wishes to produce output greater than its pre-planned capacity in the 
second period, it must acquire additional capacity in period 2 i.e. if qi > k1 its total cost 
becomes: 
C1 = (r + w)q1 . 
Since firm 2, the entrant arrives at time period 2 and has no prior commitment in ca-
pacity for all positive levels of output q2, it acquires capacity k2 to match its output, 
yielding 
C2 = (r + w)q2 if q2 :'.:: 0. 
Apart from this, we assume that the potential entrant faces a fixed cost of entry F > 0. 
3. ENTRY 
Here we will analyse the case of entry deterrence and entry accommodation sepa-
rately and ask, will the incumbent firm ever choose a level of capacity at period 1 that 
might remain unused if the low state of demand is realized in period 2, and hence, ex-
cess capacity is observed?6 The incentive for holding excess capacity is the following. 
In the first period, if the incumbent firm installs a capacity beyond or at least equal to 
the level needed to produce output in the second period, then it actually enjoys a cost 
advantage over the entrant while producing the output. For example, if the incumbent 
firm installs a capacity, beyond or at least equal to the level needed to produce output 
corresponding to an equilibrium in low demand, then naturally, if low demand is real-
ized the incumbent produces output within its pre-planned capacity level and incurs a 
marginal cost of w only, while the entrant has to bear a marginal cost of (r + w) for pro-
duction. At the same time, if the incumbent installs exactly the level of capacity needed 
to produce output corresponding an equilibrium in low demand, then it does get a cost 
advantage if low demand realizes, but unfortunately, does not get any cost advantage, 
in case the high state of demand arises. It is for this latter eventuality that it is worth 
building a capacity larger than what is needed in a low demand state; and this opens 
5 Thus only the incumbent firm faces demand uncertainty while choosing a pre-entry capacity. 
6 Notice that instead of a low state if a high state of demand is realized then excess capacity will never 
be observed because no firm will install a capacity that will remain unutilised after producing optimal output 
corresponding to an equilibrium in the high state of demand. 
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up the possibility of excess (idle) capacity. Now, this cost advantage, in tum, gives the 
incumbent firm a strategic advantage over the entrant by shifting its reaction function 
outwards in period 2, while output is produced. 
We solve this entry game in the usual way by moving backwards (i.e. first by consid-
ering period two, then period one) in order to find a sub game-perfect equilibrium. First, 
we will consider the case of entry deterrence as a continuation game. 
3.1. Entry Deterrence 
3.1.l. Holding Excess Capacity 
Suppose the incumbent installed a level of capacity ki at time period one which en-
ables it to get a strategic advantage in cost in the second period in both states of demand. 
This means, under the realization of demand in the second period the incumbent incurs 
a unit cost of production w where as the entrant's per unit production cost remains 
( w + r). This leads to incumbent's entry deterring output equal to (aL - w - r - 2-/F) 
in the low state and (aH - w - r - 2-/F) in the high state of demand.7 Now if the 
incumbent installs a capacity kf = (aH - w - r - 2,JF) in time period one to get a 
strategic advantage in costs over the entrant in both states of demand, then the expected 
profit of the incumbent becomes8 
Enf =B(r+2JF)(aH-w-r-2JF)+(1-B)(r+2JF)(aL w-r-2JF). (1) 
The corresponding subgame perfect equilibrium of the two stage game has the incum-
bent playing the strategy (kf, (q[, q~)) where kf = q~ = (aH - w - r - 2,JF) 
and q[ = (aL - w - r - 2-/F), and the entrant stays out i.e. q1 = 0 in both the high 
and low states of demand. Now this level of capacity installation by the incumbent firm 
naturally leads to a excess capacity equal to (kf - q[) if the low state of demand is 
realized. 
3.1.2. Holding No Excess Capacity 
Now consider the case, where the incumbent installs a capacity level ki in period one 
which is just large enough to give a strategic advantage in costs only if the low state 
of demand is realized. If a high state of demand is realized then the incumbent must 
increase its capacity level in order deter entry. This implies, in the second period, if high 
state of demand is realized the incumbent does not enjoy any strategic cost advantage 
while producing output. This leads to a expected profit of> 
EntE =e(2./F)(aH-w-r-2JF)+(1-B)(r+2JF)(aL w-r-2JF). (2) 
The corresponding subgame perfect equilibrium has the incumbent playing the strategy 
(k~E, (qf E, qzE)) where k~E = qf E =(al W - r - 2-/F) and qzE = (aH -
w - r - 2-/F), and the entrant stays out as before i.e. q2 = 0 in both the high and 
low states of demand. Now, we would like to see whether the expected gain in order to 
have a strategic advantage from installing more capacity dominates (or not) the expected 
7 It can be easily checked if the incumbent produces such levels of output, the entrant's profit goes to zero. 
8 The superscript E in all the above expressions stands for excess capacity. 
9 The superscript NE in all the above expressions stands for no excess capacity. 
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loss from ending up with idle capacity if the low state of demand is realized. In case 
the former dominates the latter, we come to a situation where excess capacity may be 
observed and thus Dixit's conclusion gets reversed. To see this we do the following. 
Comparing (1) and (2), we get the expected gain (EG) from strategic advantage is: 
EG = Or(aH - w - r - 2,J"F). 
Expectedlossofholdingexcesscapacity, EL= (1-0)r(kf-q[) = (1-0)r(aH-aL). 
Now 
EG > EL iff O(aH - w - r - 2,J"li) > (1 - O)(aH - aL). (3) 
Here is a numerical example, which shows that in some situations it is indeed profitable 
for the incumbent firm to hold excess capacity. 
EXAMPLE. Let aH = 7, aL = 3, 8 = 0.6, and r = 1, w = 1 and F = 1. Putting 
the specific values, we get EG = 1.8 > 1.6 =EL. 
Hence, under these parameter values it is optimal for the incumbent to choose a level 
of capacity that may remain idle if low demand state is realized. As a result, excess 
capacity may occur in the equilibrium. 
3.2. Entry Accommodation 
Now, let's consider the other possible continuation game, namely, entry accommo-
dation. Of course, it is worthwhile for the entrant to enter if the net profit (i.e. profit 
after paying fixed entry cost F) is positive. Here, we assume that is the case. We also 
assume, after entry, both the firms compete with each other a la Cournot-Nash. 
3.2.1. Holding Excess Capacity 
As before, suppose the incumbent installed a level of capacity ki at time period one 
which enables it to get a strategic advantage in cost (by shifting its reaction function 
outward) in the second period in both states of demand. This leads to incumbent's 
output equal to (al - w + r) /3 in the low state and (a H - w + r) /3 in the high state of 
demand. 
In order to attain these output levels the incumbent must install a capacity at least 
equal to (aH - w + r)/3 in time period one. So the subgame-perfect equilibrium of 
this two stage game has the incumbent playing the strategy (kf, (qf, q~)) with kf = 
q~ = (aH - w +r)/3 and qf = (aL - w + r)/3 and the entrant playing the strategy of 
selecting the state contingent reaction function Rs (qs) = (as -w-r -qs) /2; s = L, H. 
As a result, in the event of realization of low demand the incumbent is left with an 
idle capacity equal to (kf - qf). 
The expected profit of the incumbent at the equilibrium is given by, 
Enf = (1 - O)(aL - w + r)2 /9 + O(aH - w + r) 2 /9. (4) 
3.2.2. Holding No Excess Capacity 
Now consider the case, where the incumbent installs a capacity level k1 in period one 
which is just large enough to give a strategic advantage in costs only if the low state 
of demand is realized. If a high state of demand is realized then the incumbent must 
increase its capacity level in order to meet the increase demand for output in the second 
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period. This implies, as before, in the second period the incumbent does not enjoy any 
strategic cost advantage in that state while producing output. In this case, the subgame 
perfect equilibrium is given by the incumbent playing the strategy (kf E, ( q f E, q Z E)) 
with kf E = qf E = (aL-iv+r)/3, qze = (aH-w-r)/3, and the entrant playing the 
strategy of selecting the state contingent reaction function Rs(qs) = (as -w-r-qs)/2; 
s=L,H. 
Under this the expected profit of the incumbent at the equilibrium is given by, 
Errf E = (1 - fJ)(ai - w + r) 2 /9 + fJ(aH - w - r) 2 /9. (5) 
Notice that if the incumbent firm does not install enough capacity (i.e. for any ki < 
kf E) in time period one in order to gain the strategic cost advantage even in the low 
state of demand then its expected profit ETC 1 remains 
En1 = (1 - O)(ai - w - r) 2 /9 + fJ(aH - w - r) 2 /9 < Enf E < Errf. 
Thus installing capacity at least to the level of kf E in time period l, indeed improves 
the strategic position of the incumbent firm in the product market competition. 
Now since Errf > Enf E, installing a even higher capacity k1 = kf > kf E indeed 
gives rise to a high expected profit. But by doing so the incumbent faces the risk of 
ending up with idle capacity (viz., (kf - qf)) if the low state of demand is realized. 
Now again as before, we would like to check whether the expected gain in order to 
have a strategic advantage from installing more capacity dominates (or not) the expected 
loss from ending up with idle capacity if the low state of demand is realized. In case 
the former dominates the latter, we ·again come to a situation where excess capacity is 
observed and thus Dixit's conclusion does not remain valid. To see this we compare the 
following. 
Comparing (4) and (5), we get the expected gain (EG) from strategic advantage is: 
EG = O[(aH - w + r) 2 - (aH - w - r)2]/9 = 48(aH - w)r/9. 
On the other hand, the expected loss (EL) of holding idle capacity is given by 
EL = (1 - fJ)(kf - qf)r = (1 - fJ)r(aH - aL)/3. 
Now EG > EL implies 40(aH - w) > 3(1 - fJ)(aH aL) i.e. 
3 
fJ(aH - w) > 4(1 - ())(aH - ai). (6) 
It is dear from the right-hand side of the above equation that as the probability of real-
izing a low state increases (i.e. as e becomes small), the expected cost of holding excess 
capacity increases. So the incumbent firm tend to hold idle capacity only when the 
strategic advantage (which is showing in the left-hand side) is big enough to outweigh 
the cost of excess capacity. Of course, when e increases (i.e. the occurrence of high 
state increases) then obviously the incumbent is more likely to hold idle capacity. 
To capture such a situation where EG > EL, here is a numerical example. 
EXAMPLE. Let aH = 7, ai = 3, e = 0.6, and r = 1, w = 1. By putting the 
specific values, we get EG = 3.6 > 1.2 =EL. 
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Hence, under these parameter values again we find that it is optimal for the incumbent 
to choose a level of capacity that may remain idle if a low demand state is realized. As 
a result, excess capacity may arise in the equilibrium. 
We can therefore conclude that the result of holding excess capacity in equilibrium 
may arise if some uncertainty prevails over the states of demand; and this is true ir-
respective of the fact that the incumbent deters or accommodates entry. Thus, Dixit's 
( 1980) conclusion under deterministic demand is not always true when we allow for 
demand uncertainty. Hence, we have the following result. 
PROPOSITION. In a sequential entry game under demand uncertainty, to maintain 
a strategic advantage over the entrant, the incumbent firm may choose a capacity level 
that could remain idle in equilibrium. 
This shows, in general, in a model of entry deterrence, the result of holding no idle 
capacity in the equilibrium by the incumbent under deterministic demand does not nec-
essarily remain true under demand uncertainty. 
COROLLARY. Under demand uncertainty, excess capacity is more likely to be ob-
served in the case of entry accommodaton as opposed to the case of entry deterrence. 
Proof Combining equation (3) and (6) observe that 
3 
B(aH w) > B(aH - w - r - 2n) > (1-B)(aH -aL) > -(I -e)(aH - aL). (7) 
4 
Thus the inequality in (6) is more likely to hold than (3). 
Intuition: From (7), it becomes very clear that the relative expected gain from hold-
ing possible excess (idle) capacity in the case of entry accommodation is significantly 
higher than that of entry deterrence. Thus, we have the above result. 
Generally speaking, it is more likely that excess capacity will be observed in the equi-
librium when e is high, i.e. the high state is more likely to occur and/or the difference 
between the high and low state i.e. (aH - aL) is not too large. 
4. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we analysed a simple two period model of strategic entry deterrence 
(a la Dixit 1980) under demand uncertainty. We show that to improve its strategic 
position in the product market competition an incumbent firm will choose a level of 
capacity that may remain idle in low state of demand. Thus, Dixit's result of holding no 
excess capacity in the deterministic demand framework may actually get reversed under 
demand uncertainty. We also stress the interplay between commitment (by installing a 
certain level of capacity in the previous stage) and flexibility (by keeping the option to 
add on to capacity when actual demand is realized in the later stage) that naturally arises 
in this kind of situation and the effective outcome as a result of the interplay; which was 
previously missing in the literature. 
A natural curiosity would be what happens if we consider a price competition (with 
differentiated products) instead of quantity competition in the product market stage. 
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Without going into the full analysis, we can actually deduce the following. Recall that 
with quantity competition by installing a capacity beyond or at least equal to the level 
output needed to produce in the marketing stage, the incumbent gets a cost advantage 
over the entrant, which in turn, shifts its downward slopping reaction function outward 
in the marketing subgame. This enables the incumbent to produce more quantity in 
the equilibrium and earn a higher profit. But interestingly, the same action by the in-
cumbent, in the case of price competition may not be desirable. Since under price 
competition the reaction function of the incumbent (and also of the entrant) in the mar-
keting subgame is upward slopping, a similar acti.on would actually shift the reaction 
function of the incumbent inward. Now this inward movement would unambiguously 
lower the equilibrium prices and relocate market equilibrium to the lower profit side of 
the incumbent. Hence, under price competition with differentiated product, an incum-
bent firm will have no incentive to hold a capacity large enough to get a cost advantage 
in the second stage. Thus, excess capacity will not be observed in this situation. On the 
other hand, notice that if the firms compete in price with homogenous product and get 
to choose capacity sequentially before the product market competition, then again hold-
ing idle capacity may arise (see Allen, Deneckere, Faith and Kovenock, 2000). This is 
because, in this situation, a larger capacity would actually make the first mover (incum-
bent) price more aggressively in the post-entry price setting game, and thus capture a 
larger share of the market. 
REFERENCES 
Allen, B., Deneckere, R., Faith, T., and Kovenock, D .. 2000, "Capacity Precornmitment as a Barrier to Entry: 
A Bertrand-Edgeworth Approach," Economic Theory, 15, 501-530. 
Bulow, J., Geanakopolos, J., and Klemperer, P., 1985, "Holding Idle Capacity to Deter Entry," Economic 
Journal, 95, 178-182. 
Basu, K., and Singh, N., 1990, "Entry Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria," International Economic 
Review, 31, 61-71. 
Dix it, A., 1980, 'The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence," Economic Journal, 90, 95-106. 
Kim, H. S., 1996, "Strategic Excess Capacity and First Mover Advantage under Variable Demand," Seoul 
Journal of Economics, 9, l 05-122. 
Maskin, E., 1999, "Uncertainty and Entry Deterrence," Economic Theory, 429-437. 
Perrakis, S., and Warskett, G., 1983, "Capacity and Entry Deterrence under Demand Uncertainty," Review of 
Economics Studies, 50, 495-5 I 1. 
Saloner, G., 1985, "Excess Capacity as a Policing Device," Economics Letters, 18, 83-86. 
Schmalensee, R., 1981, "Economics of Scale and Barriers to Entry," Journal of Political Economy, 89, 1228-
1238. 
Spence, A. M., 1977, "Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, 8, 
534-544. 
Spulber, D., 1981, "Capacity, Output and.Sequential Entry," American Economic Review, 71, 503-551. 
